

Progress toward interruption of poliovirus transmission


Global Polio Overview

Stopping Persistent cVDPV2

Preventing Emergence of cVDPV2

SAGE, 22 October 2014

Wild Poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) Cases, 2013




Country	2013
Pakistan	93
Afghanistan	14
Nigeria	53
Somalia	194
Cameroon	4
Equatorial Guinea	0
Iraq	0
Syria	35
Ethiopia	9
Kenya	14
Total	416



Israel = Env. positive isolates (2013 – 136)
Gaza = Env. positive isolates (2013 – 7)

WPV1 Cases, 2014*



Country	2013 (Full year)	2014*
Pakistan	93	212
Afghanistan	14	12
Nigeria	53	6
Somalia	194	5
Cameroon	4	5
Equatorial Guinea	0	5
Iraq	0	2
Syria	35	1
Ethiopia	9	1
Kenya	14	0
Total	416	249




Israel = Env. positive isolates (2013 – 136 ; 2014-14 , last 30 Mar 2014)

Gaza = Env. positive isolates (2013 – 7 ; 2014- 1, Jan)

*Data as of 21 Oct 2014 (including advance notifications as of this date)

WPV1 Cases, Endemic Countries, 2012-14*




*Data as of 21 Oct 2014 (including advance notifications as of this date)

Major Goals 2014


1. Stop WPV in African continent
2. Pakistan/Afghan 'on-track' for 2015
3. Stop outbreaks & International spread

NIGERIA




Trends in LQAS results


KANO



WPV Cases, Previous 6 Months





International exportation of poliovirus in 2014




Preventing International spread


- Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) declared by DG, WHO, on 5 May 2014; extended 31 July, 2014
- Risk mitigation in high risk countries
 - Intensification of mass vaccination campaigns
 - Additional investment of > \$120 million in 2014




 Countries with circulating wild poliovirus, but NOT currently exporting

 Countries currently exporting wild poliovirus

Endemic & Imported WPV Cases, Afghanistan, 2014




Pakistan: Insecurity & Inaccessibility





Inaccessibility, FATA, Pakistan

SIA until June 2014



August 2014 SIA




Despite significant population displacement from NW a proportion of population remains inside (NW excluded from Jul and Aug estimates)

Vaccination of Displaced Population from N Waziristan

650,000 IDPs from NW vaccinated in transit


No. of OPV doses given at PTPs (covering NW IDPs) in South KP & FATA by Filter & Age; (21st May – 4th Sep, 2014)



1st Filter: Key districts with direct movement from NWA (FR Bannu, Bannu, Hangu, Kurram)

2nd Filter: Other possible districts with movement from NWA (Karak, Kohat, DI Khan, Tank & Lakki Marwat)

Source: WHO



- 4 SIAs targeting IDPs & host communities
- Vaccinated >550,000 children >5 y

Risks

- Head of State commitment
 - Attention/support (Pak, C Africa)
 - Elections (Nigeria)
 - Leadership transition (Afg)
- Insecurity, conflict
- Impact of Ebola outbreak

Getting Pakistan & Afghanistan on Track

Pakistan

- National commitment, including the Military
- Emergency operations & management (EOC)
- ‘Low Season’ plan with GPEI surge

Afghanistan

- Engagement with new national leadership
- Intensified focus on ‘missed’ children
- Maintaining dialogue with non-state actors

Innovative strategies to access children


- Community engagement
- Security tailored to local context
- Operational flexibility
- Negotiated access
 - non-state actors, Traditional leaders, Military
- Transit point vaccination, internally displaced
- Use of IPV with OPV in vaccination campaigns

Summary


- Strong progress in Nigeria
- Africa can stop WPV in 2014 – Need HoS commitment in C Africa
- Pakistan program not yet on track, needs strong leadership
- Intense efforts to reduce risk of international spread
 - Pakistan situation, conflict & insecurity still pose risks
- Building trust with communities in key areas a critical priority
- Efforts to mitigate impact of the escalating Ebola outbreak

Trigger for tOPV withdrawal:
Elimination of 'persistent cVDPV2s'

Circulating Vaccine-derived Poliovirus Cases, Last 6 Months



Monthly Distribution of Cases by Country



cVDPV2 Transmission & Timeline for OPV2 Withdrawal Cases & Environmental Isolates, 2013-14


Tracking Persistent cVDPV2 Outbreaks with the goal of stopping OPV2 use in April 2016

Report date: 22 October 2014

Report date: 22 October 2014				Year / Month																														
Outbreak, year of emergence	Affected Country	Source	State / Province	2013												2014									2015						2016			
				Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	Jun.	Jul.	Aug.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	Jun.	Jul.	Aug.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.			
Nigeria, 2005-08	Nigeria	AFP	Borno														X																	
			Kano																X	X														
		ENV	Kano																X	X	X	X	X	X										
			Kaduna																		X		X											
			Sokoto	X	X						X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X										
Chad, 2012	Chad	AFP	Batha				X																											
			Borkou-Tibesti					X																										
			Kamen					X																										
			Salamat		X																													
	Cameroon	AFP	Ext. Nord				X	X	X	X																								
	Niger	AFP	Diffa						X																									
	Nigeria	AFP	Adamawa									X																						
			Borno					X					X	X		X	X	X	X	X														
		ENV	Borno									X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X															
Kano					X							X				X																		
Pakistan, 2012	Pakistan	AFP	Balochistan	X					X																									
			FATA				X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X															
			Sindh		X			X		X																								
	Afghanistan	ENV	Sindh				X					X																						
			AFP	Kandahar			X																											
		ENV																																
Pakistan, 2013 (two emergences)	Pakistan	AFP	FATA										X	X	X				X	X		X												
			KP															X																
		ENV	Sindh														X	X			X		X											
Key dates																																		

X At least one cVDPV2 reported per given month

cVDPV2 Cases in Nigeria, 2014




- 29 Separate emergences of cVDPV2 beginning 2005
- Only one dominant emergence has survived and evolved into multiple genetic clusters
- A cVDPV2 strain imported from Chad is circulating in northeast









Nigeria
Environmental
Samples






5/8 states +VE
For cVDPV2



tOPV SIAs conducted in the previous 6 months, Nigeria



tOPV SIAs planned in the next 6 months, Nigeria











cVDPV2 Cessation in Nigeria

- A large-scale tOPV SNID implemented in August across northern states after a gap of 17 mos
- IPV used in campaigns targeting children 14 wks to 5y in all LGAs of Borno & half of Yobe in Jun & Aug
 - >1.7 million children vaccinated
 - Remaining LGAs of Yobe will be covered in November
- Large-scale tOPV SIAs planned in Nov and Mar
- A bOPV round in early 2015 might be changed to tOPV based on epidemiology (ERC)

Projection of type 2 in Nigeria (IDM polio team)









Type 2 Immunity Projection under different Vaccine choices & Cov Jan 2012 – June 2015



➡ Current SIA plan may not be sufficient to achieve the necessary population immunity against type 2 (55%) in some states in northern Nigeria.

Projection of type 1 in Nigeria (IDM polio team)


Type 1 Immunity Projection under different Vaccine choices & Cov Jan 2012 – June 2015









➡ Replacing bOPVs with tOPVs in campaigns in 2014 would not significantly affect estimated type 1 immunity in Northern Nigeria

cVDPV2 in Pakistan







- 5 separate emergences beginning in 2012
- cVDPV2 circulation stopped in mid-2013 in all areas except FATA & KP
- 3 of 5 emergences and persistent circulation in N Waziristan in the setting of no vaccination
- tOPV administered to children among IDPs from NW
- Concurrent cessation of WPV & cVDPV2 by mid-2015 will be a challenge



tOPV SIAs conducted in the previous 6 months, AFG/PAK



tOPV SIAs planned in the next 6 months, AFG/PAK



Persistent cVDPV2 Cessation, Summary

- Countries have prioritized use of bOPV/mOPV1 in recent and planned SIAs to stop endemic WPV1
- cVDPV2 transmission, however, must stop by end March 2015 to meet the current timeline of tOPV withdrawal
- Nigeria:
 - cVDPV2 transmission has persisted in most areas due to limited use of tOPV
 - Persistent transmission in Borno is mainly in inaccessible LGAs
- Pakistan:
 - cVDPV2 has persisted in FATA and adjoining areas due to inaccessibility
 - Circulation in other areas has been controlled through aggressive case response and planned tOPV SIAs

Request for SAGE to Endorse WG Recommendations

- Nigeria must consider using tOPV in at least 4 large-scale SIAs across the northern states between August 2014 and March 2015, and possibly more in the northwest. Nigeria should also consider the use of IPV (simultaneously with OPV) in SIAs in areas with low type 2 immunity, to the extent possible.
- Pakistan must use the current opportunity and population access in the north-west of the country to stop the persistent cVDPV2 by ensuring that tOPV is used in a sufficient number of the upcoming SIAs targeting children from conflict-affected areas and considering the judicious use of IPV (simultaneously with tOPV).

Plans for tOPV Campaigns Prior to OPV2 Cessation

Objective


To reduce the estimated risk of cVDPV2
emergence post OPV2 cessation by $\geq 90\%$
through
achieving $\geq 80\%$ under-five population
immunity in all high risk areas

Background

- High population immunity ($\geq 80\%$ among children aged less than 5 yrs) is considered to be the most important factor in mitigating the risk of cVDPV2 emergence
- SIAs with tOPV shortly before coordinated OPV2 cessation represent a key risk mitigation strategy in OPV-using areas

Risk Tiering

(Originally to plan IPV introduction)



● Countries that use at least 1 dose IPV in their routine immunization schedule

● Tier 1: WPV endemic countries OR countries that have reported cVDPV2 since 2000

● Tier 2: Countries that have reported cVDPV1/3 since 2000 OR large/medium* sized countries with DTP3 coverage <80% in 2011, 2012, and 2013 (as per WHO/UNICEF estimates)

● Tier 3: Large/medium* sized countries adjacent to tier 1 countries that have reported WPV since 2003 OR bordering countries with current persistent cVDPV2 outbreak (if not already tier 1 or tier 2), OR countries that experienced WPV importation since 2011, including environmental data

● Tier 4: All other OPV only using countries


*Countries with birth cohort >20,000 live births per year as per UNDP estimates for 2015

Methods: Risk Based Approach

Step-wise Strategy:

1. Identification of high risk areas for cVDPV2 emergence
 - All Tier 1 countries
 - High risk areas of Tier 2 countries and other identified areas (High risk defined as >2% risk of emergence of cVDPV post OPV2 based on models by IDM)
2. Review of existing tOPV SIA plans during 12 months preceding OPV2 cessation
3. Determining if additional SIAs are needed in the high risk areas considering:
 - baseline under-five immunity levels in all high-risk areas
 - Immunity gain from each round of planned tOPV campaigns

Tier 1 Countries and Countries with risk of post switch cVDPV 2 emergence > 2% (assuming no tOPV SIAs in 2015- 2016)



Risk 2-9% or other
Tier1 Countries

Risk >= 10%

Map Scale (A3): 1:40,000,000

1 cm = 400 km

Coordinate System: GCS WGS 1984

Datum: WGS 1984

Units: Degree



Data Source:

Admin. Boundaries: World Health Organization


Base Map: GEBCO

Map Production: Global Polio Eradication

Initiative, World Health Organization

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted or dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.

Planned tOPV SIAs 12 months prior to switch (ARP 2015-MAR 2016)




Map Scale (A3): 1:40,000,000
1 cm = 400 km
Coordinate System: GCS WGS 1984
Datum: WGS 1984
Units: Degree



Data Source:
Admin. Boundaries: World Health Organization
Base Map: GEBCO
Map Production: Global Polio Eradication
Initiative, World Health Organization


The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.

MAP DATE: 10 October 2014. Version:



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted or dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.

Suggested additional tOPV SIAs 6 months prior to switch (OCT2015 -MAR2016)



Map Scale (A3): 1:40,000,000
1 cm = 400 km

Coordinate System: GCS WGS 1984
Datum: WGS 1984
Units: Degree



Data Source:

Admin. Boundaries: World Health Organization
Base Map: GEBCO
Map Production: Global Polio Eradication
Initiative, World Health Organization

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.

Planned and Additional tOPV SIAs

			# tOPV SIAs already planned 12 mo prior to switch	Additional tOPV SIAs needed to achieve 80% immunity in under-fives	tOPV doses needed for additional SIAs (assuming 20% wastage)				# tOPV SIAs already planned 12 mo prior to	Additional tOPV SIAs needed to achieve 80% immunity in under-fives	tOPV doses needed for additional SIAs (assuming 20% wastage)	
	Country	<5 Population					Country	<5 Population				
Tier 1	Afghanistan	7,516,420	5	0	0	Tier 2	Azerbaijan	903,010	0	0	0	
	Nigeria (all country)	34,806,010	2	0	0		Cambodia	1,555,070	0	0	0	
	Nigeria (North)	17,500,000	7	0	0		Central African Republic	819,285	3	0	0	
	Pakistan (all country)	23,991,570	3	0	0		Dominican Republic	1,055,160	0	0	0	
	Pakistan (high risk areas)	5,000,000	4	0	0		Equatorial Guinea	139,900	4	0	0	
	Cameroon	3,667,945	4	0	0		Gabon	220,860	1	0	0	
	Chad	2,689,955	5	0	0		Guinea (high risk areas)	2,065,155	1	1	1,239,093	
	Kenya (Garissa, Dadaab)	300,000	3	0	0		Haiti	1,321,065	0	0	0	
	DRC (High risk areas)	15,307,570	1	1	9,184,542		Indonesia	20,796,050	0	0	0	
	Ethiopia (High Risk)	13,123,940	3	0	0		Iraq	6,116,185	3	0	0	
	Madagascar (High Risk)	4,051,450	1	0	0		Lao	693,990	0	0	0	
	Niger	4,373,220	5	0	0		Mali (high risk areas)	3,909,535	1	1	2,345,721	
	Somalia	2,283,280	6	0	0		Mauritania	611,860	0	0	0	
	Yemen	5,010,980	2	0	0		Mozambique	4,612,415	0	0	0	
China	78,186,755		0	0	Myanmar	3,990,915	0	0	0			
India	133,556,330	2	0	0	Papua New Guinea	1,071,215	0	0	0			
TIER 1					9,184,542	Other High Risk Countries	Philippines	12,093,045	0	0	0	
					South Sudan		897,600	2	0	0		
					Timor-Leste		244,130	0	0	0		
					Angola (high risk areas)		3,965,000	1	2	4,758,000		
					Benin (high risk areas)		1,631,000	1	2	1,957,200		
					Burkina Faso (high risk areas)		2,932,000	1	2	3,518,400		
					Congo (high risk areas)		722,100	1	2	866,520		
					Cote d'Ivoire (high risk areas)		3,088,000	0	2	3,705,600		
					Liberia		677,900	2	0	0		
					Sierra Leone		928,000	2	1	556,800		
					Uganda n(high risk areas)	6,939,000	0	2	8,326,800			
TIER 2 and other High Risk											27,274,134	
TOTAL											36,458,676	

Request for SAGE Endorsement

Is the methodological approach applied adequate to plan tOPV SIAs that would substantially reduce the risk of cVDPV2 emergence in the post OPV2 cessation era?